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Whitewashing Precedent: From 
the Chinese Exclusion Case to 
Korematsu to the Muslim  
Travel Ban Cases 
Robert S. Chang† 
Abstract 
The travel ban cases test the extent of the President’s authority 
to promulgate orders regarding the issuance of visas and the entry of 
refugees. Specifically at issue is whether the President’s actions are 
even reviewable by the courts, as well as whether the President ex-
ceeded his statutory authority or acted in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause. Though his government attorneys do not cite to or di-
rectly rely upon the Chinese Exclusion Case or Korematsu v. United 
States, these cases directly underlie their arguments, providing per-
haps the strongest precedential authority for his actions. It is quite 
possible that the government attorneys believe that they cannot open-
ly invoke these precedents. This article argues that courts should not 
succumb to this attempt by the government attorneys to let these 
cases operate sub rosa, and instead should use this opportunity to 
repudiate two principles embedded in the two cases: that Congress 
and the Executive exercise plenary power over matters involving 
 
†  Professor of Law and Executive Director, Fred T. Korematsu Center for 
Law and Equality, Seattle University School of Law. 
 This article is an extended version of remarks delivered on Nov. 17, 2017, 
at the National Security, National Origin, and the Constitution: 75 Years 
after Executive Order 9066 Symposium, sponsored by the Case Western 
Reserve University Law Review. Those remarks were entitled, “How’s It 
Going to End?” with the title taken from the film The Truman Show 
(Paramount Pictures 1998). In that film, a button was worn by viewers of 
a reality TV show, posing that question. At times, the 2016 presidential 
campaign and the presidency itself has resembled a reality TV show, whose 
ending is not yet apparent. 
 The author is co-counsel on amicus briefs that have been filed in federal 
district courts, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, and the U.S. Supreme Court 
that have supported the legal challenges to the various iterations of the 
Muslim travel ban. This Article is informed by his work in those cases. The 
author is grateful for the work of his co-counsel in those cases, especially 
pro bono counsel at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018 
Whitewashing Precedent 
1184 
immigration and the border that is not subject to judicial review; and 
that the judiciary must defer to the Executive without meaningful ju-
dicial review when national security is invoked. So far, federal courts 
have faithfully executed their role in our democratic system of checks 
and balances. They have fulfilled their constitutional obligations by 
reviewing the actions of the Executive and not merely acting as a rub-
ber stamp to action taken in the name of national security. Time will 
tell whether this will hold with the Supreme Court. 
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Introduction: A Profound Sense of Déjà Vu 
On January 27, 2017, Hameed Khalid Darweesh, his wife, and his 
three children were seated in a plane headed to New York City.1 They 
were traveling with “golden tickets” authorizing them to enter the 
United States.2 They had qualified to come to the United States be-
cause Hameed, an Iraqi citizen, had worked in Iraq for the United 
States as an interpreter, electrical engineer, and a contractor.3 This 
 
1. Michael D. Shear et al., Judge Blocks Trump Order on Refugees Amid 
Chaos and Outcry Worldwide, N.Y. Times (Jan. 28, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/refugees-detained-at-us-airports-prompt 
ing-legal-challenges-to-trumps-immigration-order.html [https://perma.cc/5 
A43-WL84]. 
2. Id. 
3. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief at ¶ 4, Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480, 2017 WL 
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had included working as an interpreter for several months for the U.S. 
Army 101st Airborne in Baghdad and Mosul from 2003 to 2004, sev-
eral months for the 91st Engineering Unit at Baghdad Airport in 
2004, approximately a year as a Project Engineer for the U.S. Govern-
ment Projects Contracting Office Oil sector from 2005 to 2006, and 
approximately five years working for Vessar contractors of the U.S. 
government from 2006 to 2011.4 He was granted what is known as a 
Special Immigrant Visa (“SIV”), made available to Iraqi nationals 
who worked for at least one year as employees or on behalf of the U.S. 
government and “who ha[ve] experienced or [are] experiencing an on-
going serious threat as a consequence of [that] employment.”5 After 
being targeted and receiving threats because of his work for the U.S., 
and having fled with his family a couple times and relocating to dif-
ferent places in Iraq, he applied for an SIV on or around October 1, 
2014.6 Following a lengthy review process, he and his family were fi-
nally given SIVs over two years later on January 20, 2017, and were 
on a plane a week later.7 
But while they were hurtling through the skies, President Donald 
J. Trump issued Executive Order No. 13,769 (“EO 1”), and with a 
stroke of his pen invalidated those immigration visas for persons from 
seven Muslim-majority nations, including those from Iraq. 8  Upon 
 
388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017), 2017 WL 393446 [hereinafter Darweesh 
Habeas Petition]. 
4. Id. ¶ 19. 
5. Special Immigrant Visas for Iraqis – Who Were Employed by/on Behalf of 
the U.S. Government, U.S. Dep’t of State, https://travel.state.gov/ 
content/travel/en/us-visas/immigrate/special-immg-visas-iraqis-employed-
us-gov.html [https://perma.cc/M6S2-7WA2] (last visited Feb. 22, 2018). 
6. Darweesh Habeas Petition, supra note 3, ¶¶ 20–22. 
7. Id. ¶¶ 22–30. 
8. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017). The 
countries singled out in Executive Order 13,769, though not by name, were 
countries that had previously been excluded from a visa-waiver program 
that allowed persons from included countries to travel to the United States 
without obtaining visas. The countries excluded from the visa-waiver 
program based on the Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist 
Travel Prevention Act of 2015 were Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, 
Syria, and Yemen. See Visa Waiver Program, U.S. Dep’t of State, 
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/tourism-visit/visa-waiver 
-program.html [https://perma.cc/9MXU-YMRH] (last visited Feb. 23, 
2018). The majority of persons in each of these countries is Muslim. Emily 
Stephenson & Eric Knecht, Trump Bars Door to Refugees, Visitors from 
Seven Mainly Muslim Nations, Reuters (Jan. 27, 2017), https:// 
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-refugees/trump-bars-door-to-refugees 
-visitors-from-seven-mainly-muslim-nations-idUSKBN15B2HL [https:// 
perma.cc/G7BL-TCLB]. 
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landing at Kennedy International Airport, Hameed Darweesh was 
taken into custody.9 For reasons that remain unclear, his wife and 
children, though traveling with him from Iraq, and also with immi-
grant visas, were not detained.10 
That evening, a lawsuit was filed with Hameed as the lead plain-
tiff seeking habeas relief and an injunction against the executive 
order.11 
The facts in Darweesh v. Trump12 bear an eerie similarity to the 
facts in the Chinese Exclusion Case,13 decided nearly 130 years earlier. 
On September 7, 1888, Chae Chan Ping embarked on the steamship 
Belgic from Hong Kong on his way back to San Francisco.14 He had 
lived and worked in the San Francisco area since 1875 when he ar-
rived from China.15 After working nearly twelve years in the United 
States, Mr. Ping left on June 2, 1887, to visit China.16 Before leaving 
 
9. Nicholas Kulish, Iraqi Immigrant, Caught in a Trump Policy Tangle, Is 
Allowed to Stay, N.Y. Times (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/01/28/us/iraqi-immigrant-donald-trump-airport-detention.html 
[https://perma.cc/JP5R-2BHC]. 
10. See id. 
11. See Darweesh Habeas Petition, supra note 3. 
12. No. 1:17-cv-00480, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017). 
13. Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). This case came to be known as 
the Chinese Exclusion Case and is referred to as such in a number of cases, 
including in recent decisions. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 
695 (2001); Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 
408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 
U.S. 206, 210 (1953); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 
U.S. 304, 317 (1936). Many courts and scholars refer to the case as Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States, though even that locution is problematic. As 
can be gleaned from the case, his surname was Ping. The case should be 
called Ping v. United States. 130 U.S. at 581. This also applies to the other 
cases from this era. Another example of a troubling naming convention is 
the way Westlaw, and West’s Supreme Court Reporter, refer to Korematsu 
v. United States as Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States. In addition to 
inserting “Toyosaburo” as part of the case name, West editors inserted 
“Toyosaburo” in the synopsis of the opinion, even though the official 
reporter, U.S. Reports, did not. Compare 323 U.S. 214 (1944) with 65 S. 
Ct. 193 (1944). One possible explanation for inserting “Toyosaburo” in the 
synopsis when the Supreme Court justices just referred to him as 
“Korematsu” was to make a person whose first name was Fred sound more 
foreign. West carries forward this alteration and inserts “Toyosaburo” as 
part of the case name in later cases that cite Korematsu. See, e.g., 
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 72 S. Ct. 512, 519–20 nn.16–17 (1952); 
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 73 S. Ct. 625, 634 n.5 (1953). 
14. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 582. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
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for China, he obtained a “certificate of return” that would permit re-
entry to the United States.17 Starting in 1884, this certificate of return 
provided the only legal means by which a Chinese laborer in the 
United States would be permitted to leave and return.18 On October 
8, 1888, the Belgic arrived in San Francisco and Mr. Ping presented 
his certificate to the proper custom-house officers but was denied per-
mission to land.19 Though his certificate was valid when issued, and 
valid when he left Hong Kong, while the steamship Belgic was making 
its way across the Pacific Ocean, President Grover Cleveland signed 
the Scott Act of 1888 on October 1, which canceled all previously 
issued “certificates of return.”20 
Held aboard the Belgic, he sued for habeas relief, challenging the 
Scott Act.21 Described more fully below, he was unsuccessful and he 
was forced to return to China; what happened to him thereafter is not 
known.22 But his legal challenge produced what has come to be known 
as the plenary power doctrine, a deformity in our constitutional jur-
isprudence that has produced, and continues to produce, much 
mischief.23 
The facts in Darweesh also raise issues similar to those in 
Korematsu v. United States,24 which was decided nearly seventy-five 
years ago. During World War II, Fred Korematsu was convicted of 
 
17. Id. 
18. See Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, § 4, 23 Stat. 115. The Court, in Heong v. 
United States, made clear that this Act could not be applied retroactively 
to Chinese laborers who had left prior to its enactment and its requirement 
of a certificate of reentry, but otherwise left the Act intact and not in 
violation of existing treaties between the United States and China. 112 
U.S. 536, 560 (1884). 
19. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 582. 
20. Scott Act of 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504, repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 1943, 
ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. 
21. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 582. 
22. Kit Johnson, Chae Chan Ping at 125: An Introduction, 68 Okla. L. Rev. 
3, 4 (2015) (“As for what happened to Chae Chan Ping after his final 
deportation and return to China, nothing is known.”). 
23. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary 
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 
Yale L.J. 545, 550, 613 (1990); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and 
United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its 
Progeny, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 853, 862–63 (1987) (acknowledging that the 
power to control immigration is plenary, but criticizing the Chinese 
Exclusion Case as an “embarrassment”); Stephen H. Legomsky, 
Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power, 1984 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 255, 255. 
24. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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violating Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, the authority for which 
came from President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066.25 
The Exclusion Order required “all persons of Japanese ancestry, both 
alien and non-alien, be excluded from” a certain area and required “[a] 
responsible member of each family, and each individual living alone, 
in the above described area” to report to a Civil Control Station.26 
Justice Hugo Black, delivering the opinion of the Court in Korematsu, 
noted that: 
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single 
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all 
such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts 
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public 
necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such 
restrictions; racial antagonism never can.27 
Though denial of entry to the United States for non-U.S. 
nationals is certainly different from the forced removal and incarcer-
ation of persons of Japanese ancestry, a key shared question is wheth-
er the wholesale lumping together of people based on nationality for 
discriminatory treatment can be justified in the name of national 
security. This requires a determination of what the role of the judi-
ciary will be in assessing whether sufficient pressing public necessity 
exists to warrant such discriminatory treatment. In addition, at stake 
today is the seriousness with which the judiciary will examine whether 
religious animosity motivates the executive orders. 
Though Hameed Darweesh was released and allowed to join his 
family,28 and eventually that lawsuit was settled,29 other legal chal-
lenges to later iterations of Executive Order 13,769 currently remain 
before the courts and will be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court, as 
it made clear when it stayed the injunctions issued by the federal 
 
25. Id. at 215–17. 
26. Exec. Order No. 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1943). 
27. 323 U.S. at 216. Though credited as “announcing the equal protection 
principles of suspect classifications and strict scrutiny”, Peter J. Rubin, 
Taking Its Proper Place in the Constitutional Canon: Bolling v. Sharpe, 
Korematsu, and the Equal Protection Component of Fifth Amendment Due 
Process, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1879, 1892 (2006), Korematsu is typically placed 
in the rubbish heap of discredited precedent. See Craig Green, Ending the 
Korematsu Era: An Early View from the War on Terror Cases, 105 Nw. 
U. L. Rev. 983, 985 (2011) (“Every American lawyer knows Korematsu v. 
United States as a discredited precedent.”). 
28. Kulish, supra note 9. 
29. See Settlement Agreement, Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480, 2017 
WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2017), ECF No. 218. 
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district courts in Hawaii and Maryland.30 After staying the injunc-
tions,31 and following a per curiam opinion by the Ninth Circuit 
affirming the injunction, the Court has accepted review of Hawaii v. 
Trump with regard to what might be referred to as EO3.32 Argument 
took place on April 25, 2018, and the Court is expected to issue its 
decision by the end of June when the Court recesses for the summer. 
When the Court finally addresses the merits, a key question is 
whether history will repeat itself with an affirmation, sub rosa, of the 
Chinese Exclusion Case and Korematsu v. United States. Though the 
government attorneys defending the Muslim travel ban do not cite to 
or directly rely upon the Chinese Exclusion Case or Korematsu, these 
cases underlie their arguments, and perhaps provide the strongest 
precedential authority for President Trump’s executive actions.33 More 
directly, a number of the cases the government relies upon cite di-
rectly to the Chinese Exclusion Case and Korematsu; however, as 
 
30. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (2017). Executive Order 
13,769, portions of which were deemed illegal by various courts, was 
supplanted on March 6, 2017, by Executive Order 13,780, bearing the same 
name as the first. See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (2017). 
After courts again blocked much of its implementation, and shortly before 
oral argument before the Supreme Court, a third version of the Muslim 
travel ban, Presidential Proclamation 9,645, was issued. See Proclamation 
No. 9,645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017). The legality of this third 
iteration remains before the courts. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 542 
(Mem) (2017) (granting stay and noting that “[i]f the Court grants the 
petition for a writ of certiorari, this order shall terminate when the Court 
enters its judgment” and also stating, “[i]n light of its decision to consider 
the case on an expedited basis, we expect that the Court of Appeals will 
render its decision with appropriate dispatch”). The Ninth Circuit rendered 
its decision on December 22, 2017, affirming the district court’s finding 
that the latest iteration of the travel ban, Proclamation 9,645, exceeded the 
scope of the President’s delegated authority; limiting the scope of the 
district court’s injunction to “foreign nationals who have a bona fide 
relationship with a person or entity in the United States,” and staying its 
decision “pending Supreme Court review.” Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 
673, 702 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 923 (Mem) (2018). A 
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on January 5, 2018. Petition for a 
Writ of Certiorari, Trump v. Hawaii, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-
965). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction granted by 
the district court and stayed its decision pending “the Supreme Court’s 
decision.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 888 F.3d 233, 274 
(2018). In the meantime, Judge Robart issued an injunction that partially 
lifts the ban on refugees in Doe v. Trump. No. C17-0178JLR, C17-
1707JLR, 2017 WL 6551491, at *26 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 23, 2017).  
31. See 138 S. Ct. at 542 (granting government’s application for a stay of the 
district court’s Oct. 20, 2017, preliminary injunction order). 
32. 878 F.3d 662, cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2017). 
33. See infra Part III. 
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explained below, the government attorneys’ citations obscure the con-
nection.34 
A proper appreciation of the ways the Chinese Exclusion Case 
and Korematsu lie at the heart of the defense of the Muslim travel 
ban is necessary to understand fully what is at stake doctrinally. Once 
these cases are addressed openly, it increases the possibility that the 
legal challenges will result in a course correction that 1) fixes the con-
stitutional deformity known as the plenary power doctrine and 2) en-
sures that courts will fulfill their constitutional role as a check to ex-
ecutive power and not simply give the political branches a blank 
check whenever they invoke national security. 
Stated differently, the hope is that the decision rendered by the 
Supreme Court does not reinstate the flawed jurisprudence behind the 
Chinese Exclusion Case and Korematsu. 
Part I of this Article discusses the cases upholding Asian exclusion 
in detail and explains how these cases might be described as embody-
ing immigration exceptionalism—a jurisprudence that exists outside of 
what we would expect in terms of constitutional jurisprudence. Part II 
discusses the World War II cases that embody national security ex-
ceptionalism. Part III details how the Department of Justice, in 
defending President Trump’s executive orders, relies extensively on 
precedent that is based on the Chinese Exclusion Case and 
Korematsu. This citation practice might be labeled a form of 
whitewashing. The Article concludes by arguing that the Court should 
not, sub rosa, reaffirm Korematsu and the Chinese Exclusion Case. 
I. Immigration Exceptionalism 
According to the celebrated grand narrative about the United 
States Constitution and its system of democratic governance, one of 
the most important functions of the federal judiciary is to act as a 
check on the improper or unlawful exercise of power by the political 
branches—Congress and the Executive.35 The declaration of the role 
 
34. Id. 
35. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Supremacy, 58 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 1459, 1461 (2017) (“Marbury v. Madison got it right. 
Chief Justice John Marshall explained that the Constitution exists to 
impose limits on government powers, and these limits are meaningless 
unless subject to judicial enforcement.”); Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence 
of Judicial Independence, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 671, 671 (1980) (“The 
genius of the American Constitution is the creation of a national 
government that is at once powerful and effective, and yet restrained by 
internal checks and balances from tyrannical abuses of its power.”). 
 Because the authority of President Trump to promulgate EO1, EO2, and 
EO3 derives from a grant of Congress, this Article does not explore the 
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of judicial review of the actions of the Legislature and the Executive, 
within constitutional jurisprudence, is usually attributed to Chief 
Justice John Marshall, who, in Marbury v. Madison,36 stated that 
“[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that 
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is 
written.” 37  Out of this eventually emerged a notion of judicial 
supremacy.38 In the context of school desegregation by judicial com-
mand, the Court in Cooper v. Aaron39 declared that Marbury v. 
Madison set forth the “basic principle that the federal judiciary is su-
preme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that prin-
ciple has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as 
 
difficulties and nuances that arise if the authority had been one directly 
provided the Executive in the Constitution or based on the Executive’s 
law-interpreting function. See generally Andrew Coan & Nicholas Bullard, 
Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 Va. L. Rev. 765 (2016); Cass 
R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the 
Law Is, 115 Yale L.J. 2580 (2006); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most 
Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. 
L.J. 217 (1994). 
36. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
37. Id. at 176. This sentence, as careful readers will note, is directed to the 
legislature. Nevertheless, even though Chief Justice Marshall includes 
language in Marbury that appears to give the Executive carte blanche with 
regard to certain matters, this power is circumscribed as Marshall makes 
clear in other parts of the opinion. Further, because, with regard to the 
various travel orders, President Trump asserts that they have been 
properly issued pursuant to explicit legislative grant. See e.g., Adam 
Liptakjan, President Trump’s Immigration Order, Annotated, N.Y Times 
(Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/28/us/politics/anno 
tating-trump-immigration-refugee-order.html [https://perma.cc/8LR8-
GLL7]; Josh Blackman, The Travel Ban, Article II, and the Nondelegation 
Doctrine, Lawfare (Feb. 22, 2018, 9:00 AM); https://www.lawfareblog. 
com/travel-ban-article-ii-and-nondelegation-doctrine [https://www.lawfare 
blog.com/travel-ban-article-ii-and-nondelegation-doctrine]. The distinction 
between judicial authority over the exercise of legislative versus executive 
power is not directly at issue for purposes of this Article.  
38. See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). The notion of judicial 
supremacy is not without its critics. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core 
of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346 (2006) (assuming 
that in well-functioning democratic institutions, there should be weak need 
for judicial review of legislation). Its defenders include Erwin Chemerinsky 
and Frederick Schauer. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 35; 
Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the Modest Constitution, 92 
Cal. L. Rev. 1045, 1067 (urging a notion of judicial supremacy based on 
what he describes as the “modest Constitution”). 
39. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  
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a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.”40 
This celebrated narrative is what is taught in constitutional law.41 
Standing against this popular notion about the role of the federal 
judiciary is the treatment of matters relating to immigration and na-
tional security.42 
A. The Rise of Immigration Exceptionalism 
Immigration scholars describe immigration law as operating out-
side of the mainstream of constitutional law, embodying something 
that might be described as immigration exceptionalism.43 By this, 
scholars are referring to the operation of the plenary power doctrine, 
under which much of what happens to persons who are not U.S. citi-
zens with regard to their entry or exclusion into the United States44—
and in some instances, deportation from the United States45—operates 
 
40. Id. at 18 (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
department to say what the law is.” (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. 137, 177 
(1803))). 
41. For a critique of the way constitutional law is taught that advances the 
celebrated grand narrative of judicial review and ignores defects such as the 
plenary power doctrine, see Janel Thamkul, Comment, The Plenary 
Power-Shaped Hole in the Core Constitutional Law Curriculum: Exclusion, 
Unequal Protection, and American National Identity, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 553 
(2008). 
42. Plenary power reserved to the political branches with limited involvement 
of the judiciary arose in the context of the assertion of certain powers 
inherent in sovereignty over “Indians, and over immigrants in entry and 
exclusion proceedings, and to justify the exercise of U.S. power abroad.” 
Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, 
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over 
Foreign Affairs, 81 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2002); see also Natsu Taylor 
Saito, Asserting Plenary Power Over the “Other”: Indians, Immigrants, 
Colonial Subjects, and Why U.S. Jurisprudence Needs to Incorporate 
International Law, 20 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 427, 447–458 (2002). 
43. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 23, at 255; Peter H. Schuck, Introduction: 
Immigration Law and Policy in the 1990s, 7 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 19 
(1989); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the 
Constitution, 7 Const. Comment. 9, 10 (1990); Hiroshi Motomura, 
Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 
70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1361, 1362 (1999); Saito, supra note 42, at 433. A 
recent article purports to be “the first comprehensive study of ‘immigration 
exceptionalism’” and provides an interesting reformulation of immigration 
exceptionalism that attempts to tie together what they describe as rights 
exceptionalism, federalism exceptionalism, and separation of powers 
exceptionalism. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, 
Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 Nw. U. L. Rev. 583, 585–88 (2017). 
44. See generally Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S 581 (1888). 
45. Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713–14 (1893) (extending, as a matter 
of simple logic, that the power to exclude aliens must necessarily include 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018 
Whitewashing Precedent 
1193 
outside the purview of judicial review. These scholars find the origins 
of immigration exceptionalism in the Chinese Exclusion Case. 46 
Specifically at issue in that case was whether the political branches 
could enact a law that abrogated rights established under an earlier 
federal law and in violation of existing treaties between the United 
States and China.47 One commentator argues that this case and those 
following it had the effect of locating federal power to exclude, not 
within the commerce power as previous cases held, but within the war 
powers.48 
As discussed earlier, Mr. Ping had a certificate of reentry that was 
issued by an official empowered under the 1882 Immigration Act,49 as 
amended in 1884. 50  While in transit from Hong Kong to San 
Francisco, Congress enacted and President Grover Cleveland signed 
into law the Scott Act, which nullified all previously issued reentry 
certificates.51 Just five years earlier, in Heong v. United States,52 the 
Court had faced a similar legal issue, the outcome of which likely gave 
Mr. Ping and the Chinese immigrant community hope.53 
Chew Heong was a laborer from China who had immigrated to 
the United States and was present in the United States on November 
17, 1880, the date a new treaty was entered into between the United 
States and China. Then, as reported by Justice Harlan in the opinion, 
“departed from the United States for Honolulu, in the Hawaiian 
Kingdom, on the 18th of June, 1881, and remained there until 
 
the power to expel aliens even after they have been admitted to and lived 
and worked in the United States). The Court in Ting also upheld the 
requirement that Chinese immigrants living in the United States had to 
establish proof of their residence in the United States at the time of the 
passage of the Act of May 5, 1892, “by at least one credible white witness.” 
Id. at 729. 
46. See generally sources cited supra note 43.  
47. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 589. 
48. Matthew J. Lindsay, Immigration as Invasion: Sovereignty, Security, and 
the Origins of the Federal Immigration Power, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev. 1, 2 (2010). 
49. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882). 
50. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 582. 
51. Scott Act of 1888, ch. 1064, § 2, 25 Stat. 504, 504 (1888), repealed by Act 
of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600 (1943). 
52. 112 U.S. 536 (1884). 
53. Litigation on behalf of individual Chinese plaintiffs was funded by Chinese 
community organizations. Lawyers for Chae Chan Ping have been 
described as “a ‘Dream Team’ of elite lawyers of the day.” Gabriel J. Chin, 
Chae Chan Ping & Fong Yue Ting: The Origins of Plenary Power, in 
Immigration Stories 9 (David A. Martin & Peter Schuck eds., 2005).  
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September 15, 1884, when he took passage on an American vessel 
bound for the port of San Francisco.”54 Upon arriving at the port of 
San Francisco, he was not permitted to disembark the vessel because 
he lacked a certificate of reentry, required under the 1882 Immigration 
Act as amended in 1884.55 Such a certificate of reentry did not exist 
when he left the United States and could only be obtained after the 
passage of the 1882 and 1884 Acts because it was only provided upon 
a person’s departure from the United States. As is obvious from the 
dates, it was impossible for Mr. Heong to have obtained such a cer-
tificate before his departure, and there was no provision made for any-
one who had departed before the 1882 Act to obtain one. 
Specifically, the Court had to determine “whether section 4 of the 
act approved May 6, 1882, as amended by that of July 5, 1884, pre-
scribing the certificate which shall be produced by a Chinese laborer 
as the ‘only evidence permissible to establish his right of re-entry’ into 
the United States, is applicable to Chinese laborers who, residing in 
this country on November 17, 1880, departed by sea prior to May 6, 
1882, and remained out of the United States till after July 5, 1884.”56 
First, the Court emphasized the role that treaties between sovereign 
nations play in international law and that courts should not find that 
legislation interferes with rights secured by treaties absent clear 
Congressional intention.57 The rights secured by treaty to Mr. Heong 
are found in the 1880 treaty that was assented to by the Senate on 
May 5, 1881, and ratified by the President on May 9, 1881.58 The 
treaty stated that “Chinese laborers who are now in the United 
States[ ] shall be allowed to go and come of their own free will and 
accord.”59 
Relying upon rules regarding the interplay of statutes and trea-
ties, the Court followed what it described as the well-settled rule that 
“repeals by implication are not favored, and are never admitted where 
the former can stand with the new act.”60 With that rule as its guide-
post, the Court interpreted the later enacted Act of 1882, as amended 
by the Act of 1884, as not abrogating the rights created by the earlier 
treaty. Because the statutes did not explicitly specify that those in 
Mr. Heong’s position lost their rights, the Court found that the 
 
54. Heong, 112 U.S. at 538. 
55. Id. at 538–39. 
56. Id. at 539. 
57. Id. at 539–40. 
58. Treaty Between the United States and China, Concerning Immigration, 
China–U.S., Nov. 17, 1880, 22 Stat. 826, 827. 
59. Heong, 112 U.S. at 541–42 (quoting id. art. II, 22 Stat. 826, 827).  
60. Id. at 549.  
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statutes could not have been intended to abrogate previously con-
ferred treaty rights by imposing requirements, such as having cer-
tificate of reentry, that were impossible for Mr. Heong to satisfy.61 To 
this, the Court added that “courts uniformly refuse to give to statutes 
a retrospective operation, whereby rights previously vested are in-
juriously affected, unless compelled to do so by language so clear and 
positive as to leave no room to doubt that such was the intention of 
the legislature.”62 The Court further noted that  
It would be a per-version of the language used to hold that such 
regulations apply to Chinese laborers who had left the country 
with the privilege, secured by treaty, of returning, but who, by 
reason of their absence when those legislative enactments took 
effect, could not obtain the required certificates.63  
With that, Mr. Heong was granted habeas relief and permitted to 
“enter and remain in the United States.”64 
There was a strong dissent issued by Justice Stephen Field in 
which the kernel of what came to be the plenary power doctrine was 
expressed. He denied that the majority’s construction of the statutes 
was necessary so “as not to lead to injustice, oppression or absurd 
consequences.”65 Instead, Justice Field put forward a notion, pre-
viously suggested by Justice Curtis, that considered matters vested in 
Congress to be outside of the purview of the judiciary, such that it 
was “wholly immaterial to inquire whether, by the act assailed, it has 
departed from the treaty or not, or whether such departure was 
accidental or designed, and if the latter, whether the reasons therefor 
[sic] were good or bad.”66 Questions raised about matters placed in the 
Constitution under legislative power simply did not present judicial 
questions.67 This statement is completely at odds with Chief Justice 
Marshall’s pronouncement in Marbury and, if taken seriously, would 
likely take the notion of separation of powers too far. 
 
 
 
 
61. Id. at 554–55. 
62. Id. at 559. 
63. Id. at 559–60. 
64. Id. at 560. 
65. Id. at 561 (Field, J., dissenting). 
66. Id. at 564. 
67. Id. at 563. 
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Justice Field went on to describe the legislation in question as the 
product of 
[t]houghtful persons who were exempt from race prejudices 
[who] saw . . . the certainty, at no distant day, that from the 
unnumbered millions on the opposite shores of the Pacific, vast 
hordes would pour in upon us, overrunning our coast and 
controlling its institutions. A restriction upon their further 
immigration was felt to be necessary to prevent the degradation 
of white labor, and to preserve to ourselves the inestimable 
benefits of our Christian civilization.68 
Several years later, Justice Field was able to return to this notion 
of invasion to anchor the Court’s examination of the next restrictive 
legislation directed toward the Chinese, the Scott Act that voided all 
previously issued certificates of reentry and forbid the issuance of new 
ones.69 
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice Field, the Court in the 
Chinese Exclusion Case described the problem created by Chinese 
immigrant laborers who came into competition “with our artisans and 
mechanics, as well as our laborers in the field.”70 Though the Court 
was generous in describing the Chinese immigrant laborers as indus-
trious and frugal, these qualities that might otherwise commend a 
group or individuals gets flipped and becomes the basis for unfair 
competition: 
Not being accompanied by families, except in rare instances, 
their expenses were small; and they were content with the 
simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our laborers and 
artisans. The competition between them and our people was for 
this reason altogether in their favor, and the consequent 
irritation, proportionately deep and bitter, was followed, in 
many cases, by open conflicts, to the great disturbance of the 
public peace. The differences of race added greatly to the 
difficulties of the situation . . . . [T]hey remained strangers in 
the land, residing apart by themselves, and adhering to the 
customs and usages of their own country. It seemed impossible 
for them to assimilate with our people, or to make any change 
in their habits or modes of living.71 
 
68. Id. at 569. 
69. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
70. 130 U.S. 581, 594 (1888) (emphasis added). 
71. Id. at 595. 
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The Court then went on to validate the fear of those who “pe-
titioned earnestly for protective legislation” because “the people of the 
coast saw, or believed they saw, in the facility of immigration, and in 
the crowded millions in China, where population presses upon the 
means of subsistence, great danger that at no distant day that portion 
of our country would be overrun by them . . . .”72 These earnest 
people felt that Chinese “immigration was in numbers approaching 
the character of an Oriental invasion, and was a menace to our civil-
ization.”73 
With this factual background, the Court emphasized that the Act 
of 1882 was entitled, “An act to execute certain treaty stipulations 
relating to [the] Chinese.”74 As such, the legislation did not create any 
independent rights beyond any that might be contained in the treaty. 
The Court acknowledged that the Scott Act contravened “express 
stipulations of the treaty of 1868 and of the supplemental treaty of 
1880.”75 But unlike a property right that might be created by treaty, 
the treaty provision that allows a Chinese laborer to go and come of 
their own free will and accord is understood by the Court to be a 
privilege that is held subject to the grantor’s prerogative. With no 
vested right in sight, the issue of retroactive application, which both-
ered the majority in Heong, is finessed by the Court in the Chinese 
Exclusion Case. 
The Court emphasized that “[t]hose laborers are not citizens of 
the United States; they are aliens.”76 In saying this, the Court glossed 
over the fact that the naturalization statutes then in effect only per-
mitted “aliens being free white persons, and to aliens of African na-
tivity and to persons of African descent”77 to naturalize. The 1882 Act 
explicitly foreclosed that pathway to citizenship for immigrants from 
China, mandating “[t]hat hereafter no State court or court of the 
United States shall admit Chinese to citizenship; and all laws in 
conflict with this act are hereby repealed.”78 Even if Mr. Ping had de-
sired to become a U.S. citizen, that pathway was doubly foreclosed to 
him by the Naturalization Act of 1870 and the Chinese Exclusion Act 
of 1882. Any connections he may have made to individuals and to the 
 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 597 (quoting Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58). 
75. Id. at 600. 
76. Id. at 603. 
77. Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 80, 18 Stat. 316, 318, amending Act of July 14, 
1870, ch. 254, 16 Stat. 254.  
78. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, § 14, 22 Stat. 58, repealed by Act of Dec. 17, 
1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018 
Whitewashing Precedent 
1198 
local community in his twelve years of residence in the United States 
and any expectation he may have had with regard to his return are 
disregarded by the Scott Act.79 In the eyes of the law and of the 
Court, he is forever an “alien.” 
Once the Chinese were placed in the juridical category of “alien,” 
then Mr. Ping’s challenge became an easy one to resolve. The Court 
set up a first principle that located the power to exclude aliens as in-
cident to and inherent in sovereignty. It then connected this power to 
a sovereign nation’s war powers and prerogatives to protect itself: 
To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign 
aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every 
nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations 
are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such 
aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign 
nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes of its 
people crowding in upon us . . . . If, therefore, the government 
of the United States, through its legislative department, 
considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this 
country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its 
peace and security, their exclusion is not to be stayed because at 
the time there are no actual hostilities with the nation of which 
the foreigners are subjects. The existence of war would render 
the necessity of the proceeding only more obvious and pressing. 
The same necessity, in a less pressing degree, may arise when 
war does not exist, and the same authority which adjudges the 
necessity in one case must also determine it in the other.80 
Control over its borders and the body of the immigrant becomes a 
matter of national security, in wartime or not.81 And whether in war-
time or not, the determination by the political branches of what is in 
 
79. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504.  
80. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606. 
81. It is this language that leads Matthew Lindsay to argue that the Chinese 
Exclusion Case marks a shift in the locus of the federal government’s 
power to regulate immigration. He notes that just “five years . . . [before 
the Chinese Exclusion Case] in the Head Money Cases, the Court had 
reaffirmed that a federal statute ‘designed to mitigate the evils inherent in 
the business of bringing foreigners to this country’ lay squarely within 
Congress’s commerce power.” Lindsay, supra note 48, at 45–46 (citing 
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 595 (1884)). However, the constitutional 
structural argument is probably a little more muddied and muddled. For 
example, the 1891 Immigration Act that made a big step toward 
federalizing the administrative immigration structure made immigration 
officials part of the Treasury Department, whose authority stems from the 
Commerce Clause and not from war powers. Immigration Act of March 3, 
1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.  
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the nation’s best interests is “conclusive upon the judiciary.”82 And 
with that, the Court abdicated the role it was intended to play in our 
constitutional democracy in which the judiciary was to act as a check 
on the improper or unlawful exercise of power by the other branches. 
In this arena—control over our borders and immigration—the power 
of the political branches became unbounded, operating largely outside 
of judicial oversight. Hence, the plenary power doctrine and immi-
gration exceptionalism were born. 
The Scott Act of 1888 invalidated Mr. Ping’s reentry certificate as 
well as the certificates of up to 20,000 other Chinese laborers who had 
obtained such certificates. As many as 600 may have been in transit, 
like Mr. Ping, when the Scott Act went into effect.83 
Part of what the Court ceded in the Chinese Exclusion Case, the 
legislature expressly claimed in the Immigration Act of 1891.84 It con-
tinued the push to federalize the bureaucratic immigration system and 
included a specific jurisdiction stripping provision. Within the Treas-
ury Department, it created a new office of the superintendent of 
immigration and provided for inspection officers and their assistants 
whose decisions “touching the right of any alien to land, when adverse 
to such right, shall be final unless appeal be taken to the super-
intendent of immigration, whose action shall be subject to review by 
the Secretary of the Treasury.”85 This section seemed to conflict with 
or exist in tension with section 13 of the statute, which stated: “That 
the circuit and district courts of the United States are hereby invested 
with full and concurrent jurisdiction of all causes, civil and criminal, 
arising under any of the provisions of this act.”86 The Court was 
quickly given an opportunity to determine what the role of the federal 
judiciary was to be. 
Nishimura Ekiu arrived at the port of San Francisco on May 7, 
1891.87 Like Mr. Ping before her, she arrived on the steamship Belgic, 
though she departed from Yokohama, Japan.88 Acting under authority 
of the Immigration Act of 1891, an immigration inspection officer de-
termined that Ms. Ekiu was “a person without means of support, 
without relatives or friends in the United States,” and “a person 
unable to care for herself, and liable to become a public charge, and 
 
82. Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606. 
83. Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504.  
84. Immigration Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084. 
85. Id. § 8, 26 Stat. at 1085. 
86. Id. § 13, 26 Stat. at 1086. 
87. Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 652 (1892). 
88. Id. 
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therefore inhibited from landing.”89 The Court acknowledged that an 
“alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer claiming 
authority to do so under an act of Congress, and thereby restrained of 
his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain 
whether the restraint is lawful.”90 Then, the Court proceeded to in-
sulate the decisions of the immigration officials from judicial review 
by characterizing the decisions made by immigration officials under 
section 8 of the 1891 Immigration Act as discretionary acts entrusted 
by Congress to executive officers to investigate and ascertain facts 
such that the executive officer “is made the sole and exclusive judge 
of the existence of those facts, and no other tribunal, unless expressly 
authorized by law to do so, is at liberty to re-examine or controvert 
the sufficiency of the evidence on which he acted.”91 Thus, with regard 
to “foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any 
domicile or residence within the United States, nor even been 
admitted into the country pursuant to law . . . the decisions of exec-
utive or administrative officers, acting within powers expressly con-
ferred by Congress, are due process of law.”92 
Then, with regard to the possibility that section 13 of the 1891 
Act granted concurrent jurisdiction to federal courts, the Court con-
cluded without discussion that section 13 was limited only to “civil 
actions in the nature of debt for penalties under sections 3 and 4, or 
indictments for misdemeanors under section 6, 8, and 10” and that it 
was “impossible to construe . . . [section 13] as giving the courts jur-
isdiction to determine matters which the act has expressly committed 
to the final determination of executive officers.”93 
The Court in Ekiu used language that appeared to limit the cate-
gory of those affected to certain classes of foreigners, but several years 
later, adhered to the same jurisdiction stripping provisions of the 1891 
Act and held that what counts as due process for the class of persons 
described in Ekiu is also all that is required for a person claiming to 
be a native-born U.S. citizen.94  
Ju Toy arrived at the port of San Francisco on the Doric, a 
steamship from China, and was determined by a port official to not be 
a native-born U.S. citizen as he claimed; this determination was up-
 
89. Id. at 656. 
90. Id. at 660. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 664. The referenced penalties and misdemeanors were for those who 
assisted or improperly permitted ineligible aliens to land. 
94. United States v. Toy, 198 U.S. 253, 263–64 (1905).  
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held by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor.95 The district court 
held otherwise and found that Mr. Toy was a U.S. citizen who had 
been illegally restrained.96 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for 
the Court, held that the decision of the Secretary of Commerce and 
Labor was conclusive and that it was irrelevant that a federal district 
court found that Mr. Toy was a U.S. citizen.97 What mattered, then, 
was not whether or not Mr. Toy was a U.S. citizen or even that he 
had been able to persuade a district court of the same; instead, what 
mattered was the process set forth by statute and who the statute 
designated as the decision-maker. With regard to the exclusion of per-
sons seeking entry into the United States, plenary authority resided in 
executive officers as designated by statute, authority that the federal 
judiciary was not able to second-guess. 
By the time United States v. Toy98 was decided, this legal prin-
ciple was well-settled, with pages of citations supporting it.99 But the 
fact that Mr. Toy might be a U.S. citizen was more than Justice 
Brewer could accept without a strongly worded dissent. Justice 
Brewer emphasized that the procedural rules and evidentiary pre-
sumptions operated explicitly against Chinese persons such that he 
asked rhetorically, “If this be not a star-chamber proceeding of the 
most stringent sort, what more is necessary to make it one?”100 He 
characterized the decision as “appalling” and reminded his brethren 
that the deportation of a U.S. citizen under these circumstances was 
nothing short of the punishment of banishment.101 Perhaps most pow-
erfully, he ends his dissent by stating: 
I cannot believe that Congress intended to provide that a 
citizen, simply because he belongs to an obnoxious race, can be 
deprived of all the liberty and protection which the Constitution 
guarantees, and if it did so intend, I do not believe that it has 
the power to do so.102 
But to the majority of the Court, Mr. Toy was whatever the 
immigration official, as confirmed by the Secretary of Commerce and 
Labor, decided Mr. Toy was. In the eyes of the immigration official, 
 
95. Id. at 258–59. 
96. Id. at 259. 
97. Id. at 263–64. 
98. 198 U.S. 253 (1905). 
99. See id. at 261–63 (listing cases standing for this proposition). 
100. Id. at 268 (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
101. Id. at 269. 
102. Id. at 279–80. 
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Mr. Toy was a Chinese person. He was unable to persuade the official 
that he had been born in the United States and thus a natural-born 
citizen based on United States v. Wong Kim Ark.103 Congress vested 
power in an executive officer. Any process conceived or contrived by 
the duly invested official was all the due process that was required.104 
It did not matter that a federal district court had found Mr. Toy 
to be a U.S. citizen.105 It did not matter that Mr. Toy was a natural-
born citizen. It simply did not matter. 
These cases, when viewed from today’s perspective, reflect direct 
racist views, especially the views expressed by Justice Field for a 
unanimous Court in the Chinese Exclusion Case. That is the 
underpinning of the plenary power doctrine and the notion that there 
is no place for judicial review when the political branches make de-
cisions about categories or classes of people to exclude. It is a national 
security decision that lies outside of judicial inquiry. Ekiu and Toy 
carry forward what becomes, in today’s parlance, the doctrine of con-
sular non-reviewability. The executive officers whose discretionary de-
cisions are largely insulated from judicial scrutiny, first located do-
mestically acting under authority based on the statutes challenged in 
Ekiu and Toy, become, years later, consular officers stationed 
overseas.106 For some, these cases provide a strong foundation; for 
others, these cases are but the base of a house of cards. 
B. Some of the Non-Doctrinal Consequences of Immigration 
Exceptionalism 
With the courts standing down, the political branches ran ramp-
ant. With the success of Chinese exclusion, the pull factors of the U.S. 
economy’s general thirst for cheap labor produced a demographic shift 
in terms of the countries of origin of migrants.107 As the number of 
 
103. 169 U.S. 649 (1898); see Toy, 198 U.S. at 257 (announcing that “citizens of 
the United States . . . are entitled to all the rights of citizenship” and 
thus Chinese exclusion laws do not apply to them (citing id.)). 
104. Id. at 263. 
105.  Id. at 257. 
106. The Immigration Act of 1924 granted authority to issue visas to “consular” 
officers, Immigration Act of 1924, 8 U.S.C. § 202(a), who were directed 
that “[n]o immigration visa shall be issued . . . [if] the immigrant is 
inadmissible to the United States under the immigration laws.” Id. § 
202(f). The D.C. Circuit found the denial of a writ of mandamus by the 
lower court was not in error, finding that “[w]e are not able to find any 
provision of the immigration laws which provides for an official review of 
the action of the consular officers in such case by a cabinet officer or other 
authority.” United States ex. rel. Ulrich v. Kellogg, 30 F.2d 984, 986 (D.C. 
Cir. 1929). 
107. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.  
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Japanese immigrants began to rise, exclusionists shifted their focus 
from the Chinese to the Japanese. The Japanese and Korean 
Exclusion League formed in 1905 and agitated for the exclusion of 
immigrants from Japan and Korea as well as discriminatory treatment 
of those already present. 108  These efforts resulted in President 
Theodore Roosevelt negotiating the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement 
of 1907 whereby the government of Japan agreed to stop issuing visas 
to Japanese migrants seeking to come to the United States in ex-
change for Roosevelt’s promise to intercede to prevent Japanese 
schoolchildren in San Francisco being placed in schools designated for 
Mongolians.109 Just a month after the Gentlemen’s Agreement, he also 
issued Executive Order 589 by which he forbid the entry of Japanese 
and Korean migrants who had previously migrated to Hawaii, Mexico, 
or Canada and who now sought to migrate to the United States.110 His 
authority to forbid entry of Japanese migrants was given to him in 
the 1907 Immigration Act111 which states: 
[W]henever the President shall be satisfied that passports issued 
by any foreign government to its citizens to go to any country 
other than the United States or to any insular possession of the 
United States or to the Canal Zone are being used for the 
purpose of enabling the holders to come to the continental 
territory of the United States to the detriment of labor 
conditions therein, the President may refuse to permit such 
citizens of the country issuing such passports to enter the 
continental territory of the United States from such other 
country or from such insular possessions or from the Canal 
Zone.112 
Though written in neutral terms, the impetus for this provision 
was the perception fostered by exclusionists that Japan would circum-
 
108. Keith Aoki, The Yellow Pacific: Transnational Identities, Diasporic 
Racialization, and Myth(s) of the “Asian Century”, 44 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 897, 918 (2011) (discussing the League’s effort to expand the reach of 
the Chinese Exclusion Act to cover Japanese and Koreans). 
109. Peter Margulies, Taking Care of Immigration Law: Presidential 
Stewardship, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Separation of Powers, 94 
B.U. L. Rev. 105, 154–57 (2014). The political resolution between the two 
governments also satisfied the Japanese government’s desire to not have its 
citizens be subject to explicit exclusionary laws. Duncan B. Hollis & Joshua 
J. Newcomer, “Political” Commitments and the Constitution, 49 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 507, 516 (2009). 
110. Exec. Order No. 589 (Feb. 20, 1907). 
111. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898. 
112. Id. at § 1, 34 Stat. at 898. 
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vent the Gentlemen’s Agreement that was entered into just five days 
before the passage of this immigration act. 
Following this successful exclusion effort, the Japanese and 
Korean Exclusion League rebranded itself as the Asiatic Exclusion 
League and went after the next significant group of Asian immi-
grants—those from what we would now designate as South Asia.113 
These efforts helped lead to the enactment of the Immigration Act of 
1917.114 Unlike previous exclusion efforts that designated groups by 
country of origin, the 1917 Act designated portions of Asia and cer-
tain Pacific Islands by setting forth longitude and latitude. Lest one 
think that this applied to nationals of those territories regardless of 
race, the Act applied specifically to “natives of islands not possessed 
by the United States adjacent to the Continent of Asia” and 
[N]atives of any country, province, or dependency situate on the 
Continent of Asia west of the one hundred and tenth meridian 
of longitude east from Greenwich and east of the fiftieth 
meridian of longitude east from Greenwich and south of the 
fiftieth parallel of latitude north, except that portion of said 
territory situate between the fiftieth and the sixty-fourth 
meridians of longitude east from Greenwich and the twenty-
fourth and thirty-eighth parallels of latitude north.115 
Thus, if a “native” from one of the proscribed countries or terri-
tories were to migrate and become the subject of, say, Britain, such 
person would still be forbidden entry to the United States, even 
though there was no restriction for entry of British subjects. 116 
 
113. Vinay Harpalani, Desicrit: Theorizing the Racial Ambiguity of South Asian 
Americans, 69 N.Y.U. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 77, 124–26 (2013). Harpalani’s 
Article also provides information regarding the historical treatment of 
South Asians.  
114. Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing, National Identity in a Multicultural 
Nation: The Challenge of Immigration Law and Immigrants, 103 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1347, 1372–73 (2005) (discussing Samuel P. Huntington, Who 
Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (2004)). 
115. Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 28, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 876 (emphasis added). 
116. Justice Field, sitting as a Circuit Judge, held that the petitioner, though 
born in Hong Kong and therefore a subject of Britain, was “Chinese by 
race, language, and color, and has all the peculiarities of the subjects of 
China” and was a laborer and therefore excludable by the Chinese 
Exclusion Act of 1882. In re Ah Lung, 18 F. 28, 29, 32 (C.C.D. Cal. 1883). 
A different circuit court came out the other way. United States v. Douglas, 
17 F. 634, 635, 638 (C.C.D. Mass. 1883) (granting habeas to a person who 
was “Chinese by race and language, as well as in appearance and dress” 
but who “has been from his birth, a subject of the queen of Great 
Britain”). Perhaps cognizant of this circuit split, Congress thereafter 
defined “Chinese” in subsequent amendments and iterations of the initial 
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Though it appears that the primary impetus was to stop immigration 
from the area that is now India and Pakistan, a look at the map 
shows that many of the countries covered were majority Muslim in 
population.117 The Immigration Act of 1917 might be characterized as 
including the first Muslim ban enacted by the United States. 
This was quickly followed by the Immigration Act of 1924, which 
completed Asian exclusion and, through its implementation of a na-
tional origins quota system, had a profound impact on the nation’s 
demographic profile.118 Though nothing at the time prevented the 
federal government from specifying Asians or “Orientals” by name,119 
the legislation effected Asian exclusion through a facially neutral 
term: “[n]o alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the 
United States . . . .”120 
This phrase, “alien ineligible to citizenship,” had already pre-
viously been embraced by states who sought to discriminate against 
Asian immigrants. In 1913, California passed its first of a series of 
Alien Land Laws, which forbid aliens ineligible for citizenship from 
owning or leasing land unless specifically authorized by treaty.121 The 
purpose of these laws, as described by historians, “was to discourage 
further immigration of Japanese aliens to California and to call to the 
attention of Congress and the rest of the country the desire of 
California that the ‘Japanese menace’ be crushed.”122 The Territory of 
 
1882 Chinese Exclusion Act. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of 
American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1833, 1872 
n.252 (1993) (comparing Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, § 15, 23 Stat. 115, 
118 (“all subjects of China and Chinese, whether subjects of China or any 
other foreign power”), with Act of Sept. 13, 1888, ch. 1015, § 3, 25 Stat. 
476, 476 (“all persons of the Chinese race”)). 
117. Compare Jeff Nilsson, America’s Last Massive Immigration Ban: 100 
Years Ago, Saturday Evening Post (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www. 
saturdayeveningpost.com/2017/02/02/history/post-perspective/americas-last 
-massive-immigration-ban-100-years-ago.html [https://perma.cc/GX2A-4K 
RL] with Stephenson & Knecht, supra note 8.  
118. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, §§ 5, 11, 43 Stat. 153, 155, 159. In 1921, 
in response to the perceived threat posed by immigrants from southern and 
eastern Europe, Congress enacted the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, ch. 8, 
42 Stat. 5. 
119. As the Court famously stated in Hirabayashi v. United States in rejecting 
Hirabayashi’s Fifth Amendment claim, “[t]he Fifth Amendment contains 
no equal protection clause and it restrains only such discriminatory 
legislation by Congress as amounts to a denial of due process.” 320 U.S. 81, 
100 (1943). 
120. Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 13(c), 43 Stat. 153, 162. 
121. Cal. Alien Land Law, 1914 Cal. Stat. 176, §§ 1–2. 
122. Edwin E. Ferguson, The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 35 Cal. L. Rev. 61, 61–62 (1947); see also Keith Aoki, No 
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Washington, before statehood, enacted an alien land law that denied 
land ownership rights to those aliens ineligible for citizenship.123 A 
version of this proscription was carried forward into the inaugural 
Washington state constitution, which provided: “The ownership of 
lands by aliens, other than those who in good faith have declared 
their intention to become citizens of the United States, is prohibited, 
except [under various specified circumstances].”124 Not content with 
this constitutional proscription against land ownership, Washington 
state legislators enacted a new Alien Land Bill in 1921 that intended 
to prevent long-term leaseholds of agricultural land125 by “aliens in-
eligible to citizenship.” 
The constitutionality of Washington’s 1921 Alien Land Law was 
tested in Terrace v. Thompson; 126  California’s was tested in 
Porterfield v. Webb; 127  both decided in 1923. Terrace found that 
because the category “aliens ineligible to citizenship” was one created 
by Congress, that “in and of itself, furnishes a reasonable basis for 
classification in a state law withholding from aliens the privilege of 
land ownership as defined in the act.”128 Thus, there was no violation 
of due process or equal protection.129 Porterfield summarily upheld 
California’s law based on the controlling precedent of Terrace v. 
Thompson.130 
Contemporaneously, the Supreme Court made clear that a 
Japanese immigrant was not “white” within the meaning of the 
country’s naturalization laws.131 It found similarly, the following year, 
that a “high-caste Hindu, of full Indian blood, born at Amritsar, 
Punjab, India” was not a white person and was ineligible for natural-
ization.132 Referring to the 1917 Immigration Act, which forbid the 
entry of “natives” from a geographic area that included India, the 
 
Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century “Alien Land Laws” as a 
Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 37, 55–56 (1998). 
123. 1886 Wash. Sess. Laws 309; Mark L. Lazarus III, An Historical Analysis of 
Alien Land Law: Washington Territory & State 1853–1889, 12 U. Puget 
Sound L. Rev. 197, 220–21 (1989). 
124. Wash. Const. art. 2 § 33, repealed by Wash. Const. amend. 42. 
125. 1923 Cal. Stat. 1020; see Lazarus, supra note 123, at 235–36. 
126. 263 U.S. 197 (1923). 
127. 263 U.S. 225 (1923). 
128. Terrace, 263 U.S. at 220. 
129. Id. at 220–22. 
130. Porterfield, 263 U.S. at 233. 
131. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 197–98 (1922). 
132. United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 204 (1923). 
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Court stated that “it is not likely that Congress would be willing to 
accept as citizens a class of persons whom it rejects as immigrants.”133 
In addition, it disclaimed the possibility that Congress or the Court 
considered such exclusion to be based on notions of racial superiority 
or inferiority. Instead, “[w]hat we suggest is merely racial difference, 
and it is of such character and extent that the great body of our 
people instinctively recognize it and reject the thought of assim-
ilation.”134 
In addition to being barred from citizenship and many forms of 
land ownership, including long-term leaseholds of agricultural land, 
Asians immigrants were barred from a number of professions.135 A 
number of other states also forbid Asian children, regardless of cit-
izenship, from attending public schools.136 There were also anti-mis-
cegenation laws that operated to further isolate Asian immigrant com-
munities and their U.S.-born children.137 
One of the ironies of the discrimination directed against Japanese 
immigrants is that it became the basis for the judgment, deemed 
rational, by the Court in Hirabayashi v. United States,138 for govern-
ment officials to feel afraid of persons of Japanese ancestry, Japanese 
immigrants ineligible for naturalization and their U.S.-born citizen 
children.139 The Court acknowledged: 
There is support for the view that social, economic and political 
conditions which have prevailed since the close of the last 
century, when the Japanese began to come to this country in 
 
133. Id. at 215. 
134. Id. (emphasis added). 
135. Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical 
Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 Cal. L. Rev. 
1241, 1293 (1993) (listing professions which barred Asian Americans such 
as law, medicine, pharmacy, public school education, cosmetology, and 
veterinary medicine). 
136. E.g., Cal. Educ. Code §§ 8003–04 (1945), repealed by 1947 Cal. Stat. 
1792, ch. 737) (requiring segregation of Chinese, Japanese, or Mongolian 
children); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 82–87 (1927) (ruling, in an as-
applied challenge,  that when no public schools for “Mongolian” children 
existed, Chinese children may attend “colored public schools” but not 
“white public schools”); Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 F. 381, 382–83 
(C.C.N.D. Cal. 1902) (holding that segregated schools did not deprive 
Chinese students of equal protection under the laws of California). 
137. See Hrishi Karthikeyan & Gabriel J. Chin, Preserving Racial Identity: 
Population Patterns and the Application of Anti-Miscegenation Statutes to 
Asian Americans, 1910–1950, 9 Asian L.J. 1, 14–16 (2002). 
138. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
139. Id. at 96–98.  
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substantial numbers, have intensified their solidarity and have 
in large measure prevented their assimilation as an integral part 
of the white population.140 
This sentence is supported by a footnote that provides the follow-
ing as examples: 
Federal legislation has denied to the Japanese citizenship by 
naturalization, and the Immigration Act of 1924 excluded them 
from admission into the United States. State legislation has 
denied to alien Japanese the privilege of owning land. It has also 
sought to prohibit intermarriage of persons of Japanese race 
with Caucasians. Persons of Japanese descent have often been 
unable to secure professional or skilled employment except in 
association with others of that descent, and sufficient 
employment opportunities of this character have not been 
available.141 
Then, the Court stated that these laws and societal discrimination 
“have been sources of irritation and may well have tended to increase 
their isolation, and in many instances their attachments to Japan and 
its institutions.”142 The conclusion that persons of Japanese ancestry, 
citizen and non-citizen, experienced irritation, isolation, and attach-
ment to Japan serves to rationalize the fear felt by Congress, the 
Executive, and certain members of the military.143 Then, while claim-
ing fidelity to antidiscrimination principles,144 the Court upheld the 
curfew for individuals of Japanese ancestry stating: 
The adoption by Government, in the crisis of war and of 
threatened invasion, of measures for the public safety, based 
upon the recognition of facts and circumstances which indicate 
that a group of one national extraction may menace that safety 
more than others, is not wholly beyond the limits of the 
Constitution and is not to be condemned merely because in 
other and in most circumstances racial distinctions are 
irrelevant.145 
 
140. Id. at 96. 
141. Id. at 96 n.4 (citations omitted). 
142. Id. at 98. 
143. Id. at 98–99. 
144. Id. at 100 (“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry 
are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are 
founded upon the doctrine of equality.”). 
145. Id. at 101. 
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Hirabayashi exemplifies the confluence of the non-doctrinal con-
sequences of immigration exceptionalism which then validates what 
might be termed national security exceptionalism, extended to justify 
the wholesale removal of persons of Japanese ancestry, citizen and 
non-citizen, from their homes and communities. 
II. National Security Exceptionalism 
As a term, “national security exceptionalism” emerges only re-
cently in the academic legal literature and might be used to describe 
“judicial responses to national security emergencies.”146 To talk about 
national security exceptionalism presumes that judicial responses in 
this area are somehow different from what you would expect a judicial 
response would be when the political branches exercise power that af-
fects or infringes the rights of an individual or group.147 Typically, this 
description is connected to normative conclusions about whether and 
to what extent these different judicial responses are appropriate.148 
Perhaps the most well-known cases that test the outer limits of 
what the political branches can do in the face of a national security 
emergency are the four cases during World War II testing aspects of 
the incarceration of Japanese Americans.149 In Hirabayshi, the first 
 
146. Aziz Z. Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 225, 226 (2009). It is quite possible that national security 
exceptionalism is simply a new name for an old phenomenon, in the same 
way that immigration exceptionalism is a relatively new name for the 
plenary power doctrine in immigration. Attention to national security law 
has gained a renewed urgency following 9/11. Id. at 272 (describing 
national security law as “fast becoming a subdiscipline within the legal 
academy with a paraphernalia of case books, specialists, central questions, 
and well-defined camps”). 
147. Huq describes the threshold descriptive claim as “that what courts do in 
national security crises is somehow different from what they do elsewhere.” 
Id. at 226. Huq argues that a close examination of post-9/11 cases 
disproves this descriptive claim. Id. Huq, though, does not address whether 
this descriptive claim holds with regard to earlier emergencies and, to a 
certain extent, seems to accept the descriptive claim with regard to the 
wartime incarceration of Japanese Americans. Id. at 231–32. This Article 
argues that the descriptive claim holds with certain pre-9/11 emergencies. 
148. Id. at 227–29 (discussing various normative claims by critics). 
149. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 
320 U.S. 115 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Ex 
parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). The last of these cases, Endo, is the least 
well-known. See Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1933, 1934 (2003) (asking “[w]hy don’t we remember Endo?”). One of 
the reasons offered is early commentaries and critiques of the Court’s 
wartime incarceration cases considered Endo to be a case turning on a 
statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation. Id. at 1938–39 n.24 
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case decided by the Supreme Court, the Court determined that curfew 
for persons of Japanese ancestry did not violate the Constitution.150 
The second, Yasui v. United States,151 found the same.152 The third, 
Korematsu, found that exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry also 
did not violate the constitution.153 Although Mr. Korematsu asked the 
Court to address the constitutionality of the requirement to report to 
and be detained in assembly and relocation centers, the Court refused 
to reach those questions, narrowing the issue only to whether the con-
viction for violating the exclusion order should be upheld, which 
required only a determination of whether the exclusion order was con-
stitutional.154 Finally, while the Court in Ex Parte Endo155 found that 
the continued detention of a citizen whose loyalty was conceded by 
the wartime authorities detaining her was impermissible, it did so 
only on statutory grounds and explicitly avoided the underlying con-
stitutional issues.156 
To speak about the existence of a state of emergency presumes 
that there is some precipitating event or series of events that gives 
rise to this state of emergency that, in turn, precipitates action by the 
political branches. This is then followed by the end of the state of 
emergency, which presumably leads to the government standing down 
or backing off. For example, if the government incarcerated persons 
from a racialized ethnic group during war, presumably the end of war 
would lead the government to free those who remained incarcerated.157 
Thus, the incarceration of persons of Japanese ancestry, citizen and 
non-citizen, during World War II ended after the national security 
emergency ended, which preceded the end of the war when Japan 
 
(discussing Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A 
Disaster, 54 Yale L.J. 489, 512–13 (1945); Nanette Dembitz, Racial 
Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court’s 
Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 Colum. L. Rev. 175, 215 (1945); 
Jacobus tenBroek, Wartime Power of the Military over Citizen Civilians 
Within the Country, 41 Cal. L. Rev. 167, 200 (1953)). 
150. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102. 
151. 320 U.S. 115 (1943).  
152. Id. at 117. 
153. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 221–22. 
154. Id. 
155. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
156. Id. at 297. 
157. See, e.g., Public Proclamation No. 21, 10 Fed. Reg. 53 (Dec. 17, 1944) 
(rescinding Civilian Exclusion Orders Nos. 1 through 108 and Civilian 
Restrictive Order No. 1). This rescission, though, was not effective until 
January 2, 1945, and was even later, January 20, 1945, for many. 
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surrendered. There remains, of course, a factual question about when 
the state of emergency on the mainland United States in fact ended, 
aside from questions about the appropriateness of the government’s 
decision to incarcerate over 110,000 persons without any evidence of 
individual disloyalty. 
For example, when Chief Justice Stone delayed issuing the 
Korematsu and Endo opinions, Justice Douglas wrote a memo to the 
Chief Justice: 
The Court is unanimous in the view that [Endo] is unlawfully 
detained. An opinion in the case was distributed on November 
8, 1944. A majority of the Court has agreed to it. But the 
matter is at a standstill because officers of the government have 
indicated that some change in detention plans are under 
consideration. Their motives are beyond criticism and their 
request is doubtless based on important administrative 
considerations. Mitsuye Endo, however, has not asked that 
action of this Court be stayed. She is a citizen, insisting on her 
right to be released—a right which we all agree she has. I feel 
strongly that we should act promptly and not lend our aid in 
compounding the wrong through our inaction any longer than 
necessary to reach a decision.158 
The Court, which recognized that national security rationales 
could not justify the continued incarceration of Ms. Endo, or for that 
matter nearly all of the those who remained incarcerated in the 
camps, could have, as Justice Douglas argued, issued its opinion and 
remanded to the district court to act in compliance with its opinion, 
i.e., order the release of Ms. Endo. Instead, it chose to wait and issued 
its decision on December 18, 1944, the day after the War Relocation 
Authority announced that it would be closing the camps.159 
When the crisis had passed, even the remedy given to Ms. Endo, 
based only on statutory grounds, left intact the constitutionalization 
of disparate treatment in Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu. 
One of the most profound and disturbing aspects of Justice 
Black’s opinion of the Court in Korematsu is the claimed fidelity to 
antidiscrimination principles while simultaneously disclaiming that 
discrimination was occurring. Justice Black is able to say, with no 
sense of irony the following two statements in the same opinion. First 
he stated: 
 
158. Gudridge, supra note 149, at 1935, n.11 (quoting Memorandum from 
William O. Douglas to Harlan Stone (Nov. 28, 1944) (on file with the 
Library of Congress)). 
159. Id. at 1935 n.11.  
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It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions 
are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them 
to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may 
sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial 
antagonism never can.160 
Just a few pages later, Justice Black wrote: 
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of 
hostility to him or his race. He was excluded because we are at 
war with the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted 
military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast and 
felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they 
decided that the military urgency of the situation demanded 
that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the 
West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing 
its confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as 
inevitably it must—determined that they should have the power 
to do just this.161 
In some ways, it is this aspect of Korematsu that best supports 
the government in defending the Muslim travel ban. It can claim 
fidelity to antidiscrimination, that discrimination on the basis of reli-
gion is abhorrent, yet simultaneously deny that any such discrimina-
tion is occurring. Yet, when the Fourth Circuit examined EO2, in an 
opinion now formally vacated, it declared that EO2 “in text speaks 
with vague words of national security, but in context drips with reli-
gious intolerance, animus, and discrimination.”162 
One wonders how certain Supreme Court justices, if the EO2 
appeal had not been dismissed as moot, would have addressed this 
factual finding. Perhaps they would have echoed Justice Black in 
Korematsu and said: 
John and Jane Doe were not excluded from the United States 
because of hostility to them or their religion. They were 
excluded because we are at war with terror, because the 
President, properly and fully advised, feared acts of terrorism 
and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because 
he felt that the national security urgency of the situation 
demanded that all persons from the designated countries be 
 
160. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
161. Id. at 223. 
162. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 
2017), vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (mem.) (2017). 
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excluded from the United States temporarily, and finally, 
because Congress, reposing its confidence in this time of the war 
on terror in our Commander in Chief—as inevitably it must—
determined that the Executive should have the power to do just 
this. 
Or, recall the various aspects of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 
which found a constitutional justification based on the threat posed 
by the invasion of foreign hordes that would disrupt the peace and 
security of this nation.163 When did that threat end? Even if the 
premise that the Chinese posed a threat to national security were 
true, the judicial response in the Chinese Exclusion Case—instituting 
a structural constitutional approach through the creation of the ple-
nary power doctrine in immigration—resulted in a constitutional de-
formity that has persisted, making available the starting point for the 
Justice Department’s defense to the legal challenges to President 
Trump’s various travel bans—that the matter is simply not review-
able by courts.164 
Constitutionalizing discriminatory treatment, once given legal life, 
becomes normalized. Borrowing Justice Robert H. Jackson’s words in 
his dissent in Korematsu, immigration and national security excep-
tionalism each “lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of 
any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent 
need. Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law 
and thinking and expands it to new purposes.”165 
III. Whitewashing Precedent 
Can you imagine a litigant, today, citing directly to the Chinese 
Exclusion Case and Korematsu in support of his or her case? But 
what if those cases supply the strongest precedent to support his or 
her argument? Instead of direct citation, a litigant may rely upon 
those precedents indirectly by citing to cases that rely upon the 
forbidden precedents. For lack of a better term, in this Article, this 
practice is referred to as “whitewashing precedent.” 
 
163. See supra Section I.A. 
164. Brief for the Petitioners at 22, Trump. v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 
Trump v. Hawaii, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (Nos. 16-1436 and No. 16-1540). 
Trump. v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project is also referred to as Trump v. 
IRAP. 
165. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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A. Immigration Exceptionalism and National Security Exceptionalism Lie 
at the Heart of the Government’s Legal Arguments in Support of the 
Muslim Travel Ban 
During oral argument on May 15, 2017, on the government’s 
appeal on EO2 before the Ninth Circuit, Judge Paez referenced the 
Korematsu Center amicus brief and asked Solicitor General Jeffrey 
Wall, “Would the Korematsu executive order pass muster under your 
test today?” Wall responded, “This case is not Korematsu, and if it 
were I wouldn’t be standing here and the United States would not be 
defending it . . . .”166 When Wall denied that this case is Korematsu, 
one wonders, in what sense is this case different than Korematsu? 
In similar fashion, during the preliminary injunction hearing with 
regard to EO3, Judge Theodore Chuang asked, “How is this different 
from Korematsu?”167 He also expressed concern that it might someday 
be revealed that Trump’s executive action wasn’t consistent with the 
DHS report.168 Judge Chuang asked DOJ attorney Hashim Mooppan 
directly, “Are you representing to me now as an officer of the court 
that there’s nothing in there that is inconsistent with this 
proclamation?”169 Notably, Mooppan failed to provide a direct answer, 
saying, “I think what’s in the proclamation supports [the policy] 
under the relevant legal standard.”170 When asked further, “Mooppan 
said he’d read the report but didn’t think the court needed to know 
precisely what was in the document, which addresses deficiencies in 
vetting of visitors to the U.S. and information sharing with foreign 
governments.”171 In the face of responses like this, how can the judge, 
or anyone for that matter, know whether there is a legitimate non-
discriminatory reason justifying the broad sweep of the travel ban? 
 
166. Oral Argument at 23:55, Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 17-15589), https://www.c-span.org/video/?427827-1/ninth-circuit-
hears-oral-argument-travel-ban&live&start=1403 [https://perma.cc/2Q97-
3BA4]. 
167. Josh Gerstein, Federal Judge Hears Challenge to Third Version of 
Trump’s Travel Ban, Politico (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.politico. 
com/story/2017/10/16/trump-travel-ban-judge-maryland-243840 [https:// 
perma.cc/R2EP-4UVS]. 
168. Id. 
169. Id.  
170. Id.  
171. Id. 
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B. (Citation Omitted): Obscuring the Racist Precedent Underlying the 
Principle of Judicial Nonreviewability 
Rather than cite directly to the Chinese Exclusion Case and to 
Korematsu, the Department of Justice attorneys rely on more recent 
cases without acknowledging the direct precedential history that goes 
back to those disfavored cases. Compare the following two sentences 
that appear in recent briefing submitted by Department of Justice 
attorneys in the Muslim travel ban litigation: 
 
Example A Example B 
“The Supreme Court has long 
recognized that ‘the power 
to . . . exclude aliens’ is a 
‘fundamental sovereign attribute 
exercised by the Government’s 
political departments largely 
immune from judicial control.’ 
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 
(1977) (citation omitted).” 172 
“This Court accordingly ‘ha[s] 
long recognized the power 
to . . .		exclude aliens as a 
fundamental sovereign attribute 
exercised by the Government’s 
political departments largely 
immune from judicial control.’ 
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 
(1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. 
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 
U.S. 206, 210 (1953)).” 173 
  
The sentences are nearly identical. Example A’s use of the quoted 
language with a “citation omitted” parenthetical would lead most 
readers to think that the Fiallo Court wrote the words that appear in 
quotes and that it cited to and relied on other precedent in making 
the proposition. Example A does not indicate that the language that 
appears in quotation marks is from another case. 
Example B, though, indicates that the Fiallo Court is quoting 
another case and allows a reader to trace the precedential basis for 
the proposition. Here is the full quote from Mezei: 
Courts have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens 
as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the 
Government’s political departments largely immune from 
judicial control. The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping 
v. United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 
 
172. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff Joseph Doe’s Motion for Preliminary 
Injunction at 10, Doe v. Trump, 2017 WL 6551491 (W.D.Wash. Dec. 23, 
2017) (No. 2:17-cv-00178 JLR). 
173. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 164, at 23. 
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U.S. 537 (1950); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 
(1952).174 
Example A’s incorrect, and misleading, use of a “citation omitted” 
parenthetical obscures the source of the proposition. Example B’s cor-
rect use permits a reader to make the direct connection to the Chinese 
Exclusion Case. 
Though both briefs were submitted by the Department of Justice, 
the lawyers named on the two briefs are mostly different, and only 
Chad A. Readler, the Acting Assistant Attorney General, appears on 
both briefs.175 The language that appears in quotes is indeed taken di-
rectly from Mezei, so Example B provides the correct attribution. A 
little surprising perhaps is that Example B, submitted on August 10, 
2017, preceded Example A, submitted on November 22, 2017, by a 
few months. 
The key takeaway, though, is that the proposition relied upon by 
the government is not as presented in Example A, which stops at 
Fiallo, but instead is a proposition that provides a direct path from 
Fiallo to Mezei to the Chinese Exclusion Case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given the provenance of the proposition, to cite just to Fiallo is 
to engage in a form of whitewashing of the problematic precedent that 
includes clear evidence of racial animus against Chinese persons; to 
cite to Fiallo and Mezei also engages in some whitewashing, though 
this is less deceptive because the obscuring of the problematic prece-
dent is not as overt. The challenge for attorneys in both briefs is 
whether they should rely on a case that justified the exclusion of 
Chinese persons in a case where it is alleged that the travel ban is 
 
174. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).  
175. I only note Mr. Readler as signing onto both briefs and I am not ascribing 
any intentionality on his part with regard to the incorrect and potentially 
misleading citation in Example A.  
 Fiallo 
Mezei 
 
  Chinese Exclusion Case 
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intended to ban travel and refugees from certain majority Muslim 
nations. 
Given the correct citation practice followed by the attorneys in 
Example B, one might expect them to maintain this throughout the 
brief. Yet just one page later, the Example B authors follow the 
incorrect citation practice used in Example A. Here is the language 
from the brief: 
The Court has since made clear that “[t]he conditions of entry 
for every alien, the particular classes of aliens that shall be 
denied entry altogether, the basis for determining such 
classification, the right to terminate the hospitality of aliens, 
[and] the grounds on which such determination shall be based” 
are “wholly outside the power of this Court to control.” Fiallo, 
430 U.S. at 796 (citation omitted).176 
As discussed previously with regard to Example A above, the use 
of the quoted language with the citation to Fiallo with the “citation 
omitted” parenthetical would lead a reader to believe that the quoted 
language is that of the Fiallo Court. Instead, here is the complete 
language from Fiallo: 
Since decisions in these matters may implicate our relations 
with foreign powers, and since a wide variety of classifications 
must be defined in the light of changing political and economic 
circumstances, such decisions are frequently of a character more 
appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to 
the Judiciary,” and “[t]he reasons that preclude judicial review 
of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of 
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of 
immigration and naturalization.” Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 
81–82. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, supra, at 588–89. As Mr. 
Justice Frankfurter observed in his concurrence in Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy: 
The conditions of entry for every alien, the particular 
classes of aliens that shall be denied entry altogether, the 
basis for determining such classification, the right to 
terminate hospitality to aliens, the grounds on which 
such determination shall be based, have been recognized 
as matters solely for the responsibility of Congress and 
wholly outside the power of this Court to control. 342 
U.S.[] at 596-97.177 
 
176. Brief of the Petitioners, supra note 164, at 23–24. 
177. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977). 
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What you see then is that the primary citation to Mathews is 
more restrained and the primary citation to Harisiades’s majority 
opinion uses language more restrained than that used by Justice 
Frankfurter in his concurrence. Yet, you would never know this from 
the way the Department of Justice attorneys obscure the fact that the 
overbroad language of matters “wholly outside of the power of this 
Court” comes from a concurrence not joined by any other justice. Nor 
would you know that this concurrence was written by the same justice 
who famously wrote, “[t]he war power is the war power,” in Ludecke 
v. Watkins.178 He advanced a very broad notion of the war power that 
extended even after the formal end of World War II. This phrase 
brings trepidation to some in our never-ceasing “war on terror.”179 
Another example that comes from Example B authors in the 
Opening Brief filed by the Petitioners in the consolidated cases of 
Trump v. IRAP and Trump v. Hawaii is a quotation attributed to 
Justice Jackson, one of the dissenters in Korematsu. The brief states: 
As Justice Jackson explained for the Court in Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), “any policy toward aliens is 
vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous policies 
in regard to the conduct of foreign relations, the war power, and 
the maintenance of a republican form of government.” Id. at 
588–589. “Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the 
political branches as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry 
or interference.” Id at 589.180 
What is interesting and slippery about quoting Justice Jackson is 
that his writing style was such that he wrote his opinions with nearly 
all citations in footnotes, and so it would have been appropriate to 
include in the brief a “footnote omitted” parenthetical. Readers are 
not alerted to the existence of a footnote with citations, which be-
comes apparent only to those readers who go back to the original 
source. The two textual sentences from Justice Jackson’s opinion 
quoted in the brief are supported by footnote 16: 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 
319–322; Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman 
Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111; U.S. Const. Art. IV, 
§ 4; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 42, 12 L. Ed. 581; Pacific 
States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State of Oregon, 223 U.S. 
 
178. 335 U.S. 160, 171 (1948). 
179. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow: The 
Disturbing Prospect of War Without End, 2 J. Nat’l Security L. & 
Pol’y 53 (2006). 
180. Brief of the Petitioners, supra note 164, at 23. 
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118; Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250. In respect to the war power 
over even citizens, see Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 
U.S. 81, 92; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 
217—218. . . . 181 
Despite protestations otherwise, Korematsu is relevant to the legal 
challenge of the Muslim travel ban. An amicus brief submitted by the 
children of the three men who defied curfew and exclusion during 
World War II seeks to remind the Court and the public of the 
connection between the two.182 The amicus brief draws a comparison 
between the earlier decisions by the Court that “enabled the govern-
ment to cover its racially discriminatory policies in the cloak of na-
tional security” to the current controversy, in which national security 
is invoked and “the Court is once again asked to abdicate its critical 
role in safeguarding fundamental freedoms.”183  
In addition to non-justiciability based on plenary power and 
extreme deference on matters involving national security, the govern-
ment asserts the express authority of the President to “suspend the 
entry of aliens or any class of aliens” whenever he “finds” that their 
entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”184 
Though both the petitioners and respondents appear to locate the 
origins of the authority of the President to suspend entry to the Act 
of May 22, 1918,185 they are either unaware of or ignore what may be 
the first express grant of authority by Congress to the President to 
limit entry. Previously, Congress had granted authority to officials to 
administer federal immigration law, including making individualized 
determinations regarding the admissibility of aliens.186 But section 1 of 
the Immigration Act of 1907 granted broad authority to the 
President. 
 
181. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 n.16 (1952) (emphasis 
added). 
182. Brief of Karen Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, Holly Yasui, the Fred T. 
Korematsu Center for Law and Equality, Civil Rights Organizations, and 
National Bar Associations of Color as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (March 30, 2018) (No. 17-
965), reprinted infra. 
183. Id. at 8. 
184. Brief of the Petitioners at 31, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (No. 
17-965) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)). 
185. Brief of the Respondents at 38, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) 
(No. 17-965) (discussing Act of May 22, 1918); Brief of Petitioners, supra 
note 184, at 32 (same). 
186. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, §§ 1, 7, 8; 26 Stat. 1085. 
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This provision in the immigration act is of note because it is a 
precursor for section 1182(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
that ostensibly provides President Trump the right to issue his vari-
ous executive orders restricting entry of “all aliens or any class of 
aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants.”187 Compare the similar trig-
gering mechanisms required for the exercise of the authority granted 
by Congress to the President under the respective Acts: 
 
1907 Immigration Act, § 1 Immigration & Nationality Act 
§ 1182(f) 
“[W]henever the President shall be 
satisfied that passports issued by 
any foreign government for its 
citizens . . . are being used for 
the purpose of enabling the holders 
to come to the continental 
territory of the United States to 
the detriment of labor conditions 
therein” 188	
“Whenever the President finds 
that the entry of any aliens or 
of any class of aliens into the 
United States would be 
detrimental to the interests of 
the United States” 189 
 
In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt, acting pursuant to powers 
granted by the Act of February 20, 1907, entitled “An act to regulate 
the immigration of aliens into the United States,” issued Executive 
Order 589: 
And Whereas, upon sufficient evidence produced before 
me . . . I am satisfied that passports issued by the Government 
of Japan to citizens of that country or Korea and who are 
laborers, skilled or unskilled, to go to Mexico, to Canada and to 
Hawaii, are being used for the purpose of enabling the holders 
thereof to come to the continental territory of the United States 
to the detriment of labor conditions therein; 
I hereby order that such citizens of Japan or Korea, to-wit: 
Japanese or Korean laborers, skilled and unskilled, who have 
received passports to go to Mexico, Canada or Hawaii, and 
come therefrom, be refused permission to enter the continental 
territory of the United States.190 
 
187. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1182 (2012).  
188. Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, 34 Stat. 898, 898. 
189. 8 U.S.C. §1182. 
190. Exec. Order No. 589 (Feb. 20, 1907).  
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There was no legal challenge to test Roosevelt’s Executive Order 
589. Had there been one, it is likely that Roosevelt’s executive order 
would have been upheld, with the plenary power doctrine extending 
to actions undertaken by the executive, the other political branch to 
which the courts must defer in matters involving immigration.191 That 
it may have been motivated by animus would either be rejected as a 
factual matter192 or would be deemed doctrinally irrelevant, because, 
after all, the federal government at that time was not constrained by 
equal protection.193 
Unlike in 1907, there is, of course, the challenge to Trump’s EO3 
pending before the Court.194  An important and as yet unresolved 
question is whether things have changed since 1907. The Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits, in their respective opinions, have found that things are 
different.195 Each court rejected the government’s argument that the 
legality of the travel ban was unreviewable or non-justiciable.196 The 
Ninth Circuit held that EO3 violated the Immigration and 
Nationality Act’s prohibition on nationality-based discrimination and 
that the President did not have the constitutional authority to issue 
EO3.197 The Fourth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were likely to 
succeed on their Establishment claim, finding that “an objective 
observer could conclude that the President’s repeated statements con-
vey the primary purpose of the Proclamation – to exclude Muslims 
from the United States.”198 
It remains to be seen what the Court will do. 
 
191. Cf. Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).  
192. Id. (justifying disparate treatment based on cultural differences). 
193. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment due process guarantee includes an equal protection component 
that applies to the federal government). 
194. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (No. 17-965). 
195. Trump v. Hawaii, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017); IRAP v. Trump, 883 F.3d 
233 (4th Cir. 2018) (en banc).  
196. Trump v. Hawaii, 878 F.3d at 682 (“notion that the Proclamation is 
unreviewable ‘runs contrary to the fundamental structure of our 
constitutional democracy’”) (quoting Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 
1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017)); IRAP v. Trump, 883 F.3d at 257 (finding 
Establishment claim justiciable). 
197. Hawaii, 878 F.3d at 673. 
198. IRAP, 883 F.3d at 268. 
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Conclusion 
In 1948, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 
10,009, which repealed in part Executive Order 589.199 On the thirty-
fourth Anniversary of the issuance of Executive Order 9,066, 
President Gerald R. Ford issued Presidential Proclamation 4,417. 
Entitled “An America Promise,” and issued during America’s bicen-
tennial, the Executive Order recognized that along with commem-
orating great events in American history, it was also important to 
engage in “[a]n honest reckoning” and to “include a recognition of our 
national mistakes.”200 President Ford proclaimed “that all authority 
conferred by Executive Order No. 9,066 terminated upon the issuance 
of Proclamation No. 2,714, which formally proclaimed the cessation of 
the hostilities of World War II on December 31, 1946.”201 Though one 
might criticize a proclamation in 1976 that declares the effect of a 
proclamation made in 1946, the sentiment remains a good one. 
If the Supreme Court fails to check the authority of the Executive 
and in essence reinstates the Chinese Exclusion Case and Korematsu, 
we might have to wait decades for a president to issue an apology and 
a revocation of the Trump’s Presidential Proclamation 9,645. A rem-
edy, in that sense, does lie with the political branches. But it is time 
to bring immigration law and national security law more within the 
mainstream of constitutional jurisprudence. 
 
199. Exec. Order No. 10,009, 13 Fed. Reg. 6,104 (Oct. 19, 1948). 
200. Proclamation 4417 Confirming the Termination of the Executive Order 
Authorizing Japanese-American Internment During World War II, 12 
Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 245 (Feb. 23, 1976). 
201. Id. at 246. 
